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Introduction
Commercial diving is the fastest growing and most valuable fi shery in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Fig. 1) . Its share of landings rose from 14% in 1994 to 31% in 2014, while its share of revenues increased from 19% to 39% during the same period (NMFS, 2016) . In 2014, divers reported harvesting slightly less than half a million pounds of shellfi sh and fi nfi sh with a dockside value of $2.3 million (NMFS, 2016) .
The lure of commercial diving lies in its high earning potential and ease of entry. Divers can selectively target a diverse group of highly valued species such as queen conch, Strombus gigas; spiny lobster, Panulirus argus; miscellaneous reef-fi sh (Labridae, Scaridae, Lutjanidae); and octopus (Octopodidae) with modest capital investments in craft and fi shing equipment.
1 Moreover, scuba equipment can be readily serviced around the island (Valdés-Pizzini, 1992) .
In addition to low capital requirements, year-round warm weather and accessible facilities further encourage this activity (Valdés-Pizzini 2 ). Additionally, divers do not face catch and gear theft problems associated with other fi shing gears such as traps (Agar et al., 2008) . However, they face greater health risks due to the potential for decompression sickness (bends), embolism, and shark encounters. Repetitive dives increase the incidence of bone necrosis, paralysis, and 1 In 2014, queen conch, spiny lobster, hogfi sh (Labridae), and octopus accounted for 42%, 40%, 5%, and 4% of the dockside revenues derived from diving, respectively (NMFS, 2016 even death (Matos-Caraballo and Torres Rosado, 1989; González-Román, 1991; Lopez-Tristani et al., 2004) .
In recent decades, fi shery managers have become increasingly concerned about the health of queen conch, spiny lobster, and reef-fi sh populations in Puerto Rico, prompting them to adopt a number of regulations that included catch quotas, trip limits, seasonal and area closures, size limits, and miscellaneous gear restrictions. Surprisingly, little socio-economic research has been conducted on the dive fi shery which is responsible for almost all of the queen conch revenues and close to 60% of the spiny lobster revenues (NMFS, 2016) .
3 Moreover, the queen conch stock continues to be overfi shed. This paper describes the economic and social conditions of the commercial dive fi shery to assist with policy development and evaluation. To the best of our knowledge, this study offers the fi rst comprehensive view of the commercial dive fi shery in Puerto Rico.
Methods
The data used in this study was derived from in-person interviews with commercial divers (hereafter "divers") and key informants, and secondary data sources which included governmental reports and databases. In total, we conducted 81 personal interviews with divers, which is over one-third (37%) of the population of "active" divers who report landings statistics (Table 1) . Divers were interviewed using a standardized survey instrument that contained both closed and open-ended questions. The survey instrument collected information on demographics, capital investments (boats and fi shing gear and equipment), fi shing practices, and costs and earnings. In addition, it inquired about remunerative arrangements, crew organization and recruitment, and perceptions about the effi cacy of the conch seasonal closure.
The survey was geographically stratifi ed into four coastal areas: north, south, west, and east (Fig. 2) . 5 The stratifi cation helped capture the diversity of operations and made the data collection easier and more economical to administer. 5 The northern region extends from the municipalities of Isabela to Luquillo. The eastern region runs from the municipalities of Fajardo to Maunabo, including the islands of Vieques and Culebra, and the southern region stretches from the municipalities of Patillas to Lajas. The western region spans the municipalities of Cabo Rojo to Aguadilla.
To satisfy the requirements of the sampling protocol, interviewers were instructed to select a replacement diver only if the one randomly selected either refused to participate in the survey; was unavailable due to illness, death, or travel; could not be contacted after six separate attempts; or was not identifi ed by others at the fi shing cooperative.
Despite the signifi cant effort devoted to sampling, the unadjusted response rate was 58.3%. The unadjusted response rate was obtained by dividing the total number of completed interviews by the total number of people contacted (Table 1) . Reasons for nonresponse included that divers could not be reached (35), no longer qualifi ed because they no longer dove (10), gear misclassifi cation (9), and In addition, we conducted semistructured interviews with key informants to help us contextualize our fi ndings. Key informants included established divers, fi shery managers and port agents, and professionals involved in research and outreach. Unless otherwise noted, the tabulated summary statistics are frequencies or sample means with their standard error in parentheses.
Results and Discussion

Demographic Profi le
Most of the divers surveyed were Hispanic middle-aged men with extensive fi shing experience and high levels of fi shing dependence (Table 2) . Their ages ranged from 24 to 80 years, averaging 49 years. Almost 83% of the divers were in the 40 years and over age bracket, and less than 4% of the sample was in the under 30 years age bracket. However, during our fi eldwork we noticed many young divers, mainly high school and college-aged students, who reportedly do not turn in landings statistics (hence, they were not in our sample frame) probably because they fi sh on a part-time (or seasonal) basis. Therefore, the small share of those under 30 captured in our sample may not be indicative of declining recruitment rates but rather of the rise of nontraditional recruitment processes, which previously relied on kinship relationships (Valdés-Pizzini, 1992) .
Staff from Puerto Rico's Fisheries Research Laboratory and established fi shermen related that nowadays young divers usually start free diving with spearguns close to shore on a parttime basis, but once they become more profi cient they begin scuba diving in deeper waters on a full-time basis. Most respondents were owner-operators and stated that, on average, they have been fi shing for nearly 27 years (range 3-71 years).
Fishing was found to be an integral part of the household economy. On average, fi shing income contributed close to 80% of their household income. Most interviewees indicated that they fi shed year-round on a fulltime basis. Part-timers reported that they fi shed for income rather than for consumption purposes.
Divers spent, on average, 36 h per week on fi shing and fi shing related activities such as boat and engine maintenance and seafood marketing. Regional differences in participation and fi shing dependence can be partially explained by geography (Table  2 ). For instance, the north coast has a narrow insular shelf and exposed coast that provides limited protection against rough seas which hampers fi shing; however, the southwest coast has a shallow and extended shelf which makes fi shing easier (Jarvis, 1932; Suarez-Caabro, 1979; Matos and Agar, 2011) . The number of dependents (including the diver) ranged between 1 and 7, with an average of 3.6 whereas the Commonwealth's average was 2.7 (Table 2) .
In addition to fi shing income, many fi shermen receive government transfer (welfare) payments and may participate in markets for wage labor (Valdés-Pizzini, 1985; Griffi th and Valdés-Pizzini, 2002; Pérez, 2005; Griffi th et al., 2007) . Much of this wage labor is derived from low paying, casual occupations (i.e., odd jobs or "chiripas" as they are known locally). Reportedly, full-time divers mainly engage in "chiripas" during the queen conch closure.
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Pérez (2005) notes that "chiripas" can play an important role in supplementing household incomes. Government transfer payments such as food stamps; health, utility, and housing subsidies; and social security are also important supplemental sources of household income. Over 70% of the divers surveyed declined to describe their involvement in nonfi shing activities, probably because they feared that sharing this information could threaten their access to welfare programs. 7, 8 The remaining divers reported that they worked in miscellaneous jobs such as construction, fi sh sales, boat maintenance, plumbing, landscaping, and waiting tables, among others. Aside from diving, respondents also stated that they fi shed with handlines, traps, vertical lines, and miscellaneous 6 Daniel Matos-Caraballo from Puerto Rico's Fisheries Research Laboratory. Personal commun., March, 2016. 7 Krueger et al. (2015) report that a 3-member household that receives food stamps, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, and utilities subsidies can collect $1,743 per month, which is signifi cantly higher than the $1,159 that a minimum wage earner could earn. Moreover, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017a) reports that the 2014 median hourly wage rate for an individual employed in farming, fi shing, and forestry occupations in Puerto Rico was $8.96, which translates to a median monthly wage of $1,434 which is lower than the above-mentioned welfare payments. 8 Agar et al. (2005) report that Puerto Rican fi sh trap fi shermen were also unwilling to share information on their nonfi shing activities. nets, and that spiny lobster, queen conch, and various reef-fi sh were their mainstay species (Table 3) . About 75% of the divers said that they primarily fi shed in Commonwealth waters (<9 nmi).
Capital Investment in Boats, Fishing Gear, and Electronic Equipment
Most boats were relatively small and had limited technology (Table 4 ). The average boat was about 20 ft (13-27 ft range) powered with a single outboard gasoline engine, averaging 76 hp (8-300 hp range).
9 Most hulls were made of fi berglass and, to a lesser extent, of a combination of fi berglass and wood, or simply wood.
10 On average, divers valued their used boat and engine at $7,556 and stated that annual mainte-9 Valdés-Pizzini (1985) reports that in the 1980's the Puerto Real-based dive fl eet was made up of 15-21 ft boats powered with 40-125 hp outboard engines. 10 A port agent observed that rudimentary boats found on the west coast (mainly wooden or fiberglass-wood hulls) are called "Dominicanos" because they were left behind by undocumented Dominican immigrants after crossing the Mona Passage.
nance costs were about $1,750 (Table  4) .
In addition to the boat and engine, diving, electronic, and safety equipment are important components of the capital stock held by divers (Table 4) . Divers valued their diving equipment (i.e., tanks, regulators, spearguns, etc.) at about $1,148 and spent $293 annually on its maintenance. They also estimated that their electronic (e.g., cellular phones, global positioning systems, radio, and fi sh and depth fi nders) and safety equipment (e.g., personal fl otation devices, fi re extinguisher, etc.) were worth about $703 and $246, respectively.
Fishing Practices
Diving operations reported mainly targeting queen conch, spiny lobster, and/or various reef-fi sh. Most diving operations fi sh every day for 6-7 h and have a small crew of 2-3 (Table 5) . Fishing excursions usually start early in the morning (around 5-6 a.m.) and end at noon or early in the afternoon (12-2 p.m.) before the wind picks up. Aggregate landings ranged from 15 to 225 lb per trip, averaging about 56 lb (Table 6 ). Diving teams are composed of a helmsman (or boat tender) and one or more divers (Valdés-Pizzini, 1985; Appeldorn, 1997) . The helmsman is responsible for navigating, hauling the catch, and tending the boat to ensure the safety of the divers who are fi shing underwater (Valdés-Pizzini, 1992) . About 90% of the owner-operators in our sample were divers. Divers reported using 2-3 air tanks each per trip, although some used as many as 6 tanks. Diving depths ranged from 10 to 150 ft.
Diving is a dangerous and potentially life-threatening activity. Respondents were aware of the causes and dangers of decompression sickness (or "burbuja" as it is locally known) but offered a number of explanations for (wittingly or unwittingly) disregarding safety guidelines. The two most commonly cited reasons were economic pressures followed by operational carelessness. They explained that they were more liable to take additional dives and/or prolong dives if poor weather conditions had prevented them from fi shing in recent days or if the fi rst few tanks were unproductive.
They also mentioned that divers are tempted to dive longer if they fi nd productive aggregations in the latter part of the trip. Some divers reported using a fourth tank to catch conch in 70-90 ft depths.
Divers also cited fatigue, overexertion (due to strong currents), overconfi dence (especially by younger divers), equipment failure, and improperly accounting for residual nitrogen during multi-day and multi-tank dives for the increased risk of decompression sickness. Surprisingly, many divers reported going diving the next day after experiencing a "mild" bends event (or "chispitos" as locally known); however, they added that in these cases, they generally dove in shallower waters and for a shorter period of time for a few days.
A key informant mentioned additional factors that place the health of divers in danger.
11 He noted that many divers do not have diving licenses which forces them to refi ll their tanks in places with poor air quality because 11 Ruperto Chaparro Serrano, Director of the Puerto Rico's SeaGrant Program. Personal commun., April, 2016. compressors may not work properly or are housed in places with poor ventilation. Additionally, some divers are habitual consumers of alcohol and drugs which impair their judgment and physical performance. It was also noted that many divers do not have medical insurance for work related accidents. The fi rst treatment in a hyperbaric chamber (with helicopter transportation) can cost up to $10,000. Moreover, injured divers seeking treatment waste valuable time by initially going to local emergency rooms, which have limited experience with diving-related accidents, rather than going directly to medical centers with hyperbaric chambers.
Divers use a variety of fi shing equipment to target a diverse and variable resource base. Besides using their hands to harvest conch and lobster, divers may also employ snares to catch lobster and gaffs to catch octopus (and occasionally to illegally catch lobster). Spearguns are also used mainly to catch various reef-fi shes such as, snappers (Lutjanidae), hogfi shes (Labridae), and triggerfi shes (Balistidae), but sometimes they are unlawfully used to harvest lobsters.
Depending on the species pursued, divers may operate over a wide range of habitat types. For example, divers targeting queen conch gather them on seagrass beds and sandy bottoms, whereas those targeting spiny lobsters and reef-fi shes catch them on hard bottoms and reef areas. Once a suitable queen conch aggregation is located, divers usually shuck the conch underwater and load the meat into baskets or mesh bags, which are lifted using a winch (or manually) and emptied onboard.
Conchs are usually shucked with a hatchet or hammer and chisel (Appeldorn, 1991) .
12 Divers dislike shucking onboard (or on land) because of the added physical exertion of gathering and raising live conchs onboard and the added load of the shells which 12 According to one of the most seasoned divers in the south coast, Dominican inmigrants were the fi rst ones to shuck conchs underwater in Puerto Rico. can make the small craft unstable. Commonwealth regulations set a daily quota of 150 conchs per licensed fi sherman up to a maximum of 450 conchs per vessel (with three licensed fi shermen onboard).
Revenues and Costs
Divers reported various economic objectives for their fi shing trips. Broadly speaking, about two-thirds (67%) of the interviewees said that they wanted to reach a certain catch and/or income target (e.g., landing 80 pounds of octopus, making a small return in excess of costs). Another 25% of the interviewees wanted to maximize benefi ts (or catch as much as possible), and the remaining 9% either had either no explicit objective or miscellaneous objectives such as enjoyment or to try one's luck. Somewhat surprising, about 31% of the catch or income targeters said that they simply wanted to cover trip costs, which is consistent with fi nding of other socioeconomic studies of small-scale fi sheries (Salas and Gaetner, 2004) . Though recouping trip costs is crucial to cope with irregular fi shing income, we believe that most cost defrayers longed for suffi cient income not only to finance their next trip (i.e., cover costs) but also to satisfy basic household needs.
Diving operations gross returns per trip ranged from $75 to $700, averaging $251 (Table 6) .
13 Fuel and oil expenses accounted for 61% of the nonlabor variable costs.
14 Diving boats used between 4 and 28 gallons of fuel per trip, averaging 11 gallons. Air refi lls and grocery expenses were responsible for 25% and 10% of the nonlabor variable costs, respectively. Ice costs were minor because less than 23% of the interviewees iced their catch. After deducting nonlabor variable costs (e.g., fuel, air refi lls, groceries, etc.), net returns per trip ranged from $15 to $600, averaging $169 (Table 6).
Remunerative Arrangements
The lay arrangement was the dominant income sharing mechanism. Under lay arrangements, capital and labor are remunerated based on a percentage of the net returns (gross revenues minus variable expenses) rather than a fi xed wage. Lay arrangements are designed to cope with fl uctuating catches and prices. They help spread production risk because the boat owner's labor obligations are reduced if catches are poor. Conversely, boat owners' returns are dampened when catches are bountiful making it harder to amass capital and discharge debts (Symes and Frangoudes, 2001 ). In addition to spreading risk, lay arrangements encourage and reward teamwork and productivity by making each crew member a partner in the enterprise (Acheson, 1981; Doeringer et al., 1986) .
The survey showed that income sharing rules between capital and labor 13 Divers also sell natural queen conch pearls but their occurrence is very rare. Pearls retail between $300 and $30,000 depending on their size and quality. 14 When we asked if they would change the way they operated if gasoline prices rose signifi cantly about 40% said they would. The most frequently cited coping mechanisms were to fi sh closer to shore and raise fi sh prices. Only one of the divers proposed reducing the size of the crew or switching fi shing gears. varied signifi cantly and that these were not always clear cut, particularly when the boat owner was one of the divers (Boncoeur et al., 2000; Guillen et al., 2015) . Just over half (51%) of the interviewees reported that boat owners did not receive a boat share; however, they acknowledged that crew members contributed when repairs were needed. 15 The two main reasons offered for ceding the boat share were crew coownership of the enterprise (kin-based enterprise) and meager returns. Another 21% of the interviewees stated that there was not an explicit boat share, but explained that, for owners of larger boats, the owner share implicitly accounted for an unspecifi ed return on capital and/or an allowance for maintenance expenses. An additional 20% said that boat owners charged a fi xed amount for upkeep that ranged from $5 to $55 per trip. Only 7% of the respondents reported that there was an overt boat share that ranged from 15% to 35%.
The distribution of income between owner-operators and crew was fairly egalitarian. By and large, owner-operator and crew shares were roughly inversely related to the size of the labor force. For example, in 2-person operations, the average owner operator share was about 55% (range 33-75%). About 67% of these operations reported an equal allocation of fi shing income between owner-operators and crew. Similarly, in 3-person operations, the average owner-operator share was about 34% (range 25-50%).
About 71% of these operations reported that fi shing income was equally split between owner-operators and crew. Interviewees argued that the egalitarian distribution of income helped motivate and fairly reward crew since diving is a dangerous and labor intensive activity. Divers said that they placed their lives at risk every time they went out fi shing. In addition, they 15 Forgoing boat shares has been documented in the Puerto Rican small-scale hook and line and trap fi sheries (Agar and Shivlani, 2016; Agar et al., 2017) . Similarly, Salazar Espinosa (2015) reports that artisanal fi shermen in Chile often have their fi shing income tied to their labor rather than to the provision of capital. noted that the income split was customary and that crew often contributed to the enterprise by bringing their own gear. Divers received a higher compensation than boat tenders because of their contribution to revenues. The study estimated that the average owner-operator earned about $72 per trip ($58 median, $8-$235 range) whereas a crew member netted almost $61 per trip ($50 median, $5-$235 range).
16 Occasionally, crew members would receive additional compensation if the trip was particularly successful. Valdés-Pizzini (1985) reports that, in the early 1980's, an owner-operator (in a 2-person operation) would earn $90 ($205 in today's dollars) and his boat tender would make $30 ($68 in today's dollars) during a good trip.
Although these latter income statistics may not be strictly comparable because they are confi ned to the port of Puerto Real, they may still be refl ective of declining labor returns owing to the heavy exploitation of inshore grounds and stricter regulations (e.g., hookah ban, seasonal closure, 350 conch trip limit). Matos-Caraballo (2009) reports that declining queen conch stocks in the 1980's forced divers to move into deeper waters (from 4-12 to 70 ft).
Crew responsibilities extended beyond fi shing. About 58% of the respondents said crew members helped with various cleaning, maintenance, and repair chores. Most of these fi shing related activities were unpaid. Agar et al. (2008) suggest that this unremunerated assistance arises from shared cultural values of mutual help. Only 10% of the respondents said that the crew helped fi nance trip-related expenses (e.g., fuel) and/or the purchase of crafts, engines, and/or gear.
Crew Composition, Recruitment, and Turnover
The composition of the crew was found to be dominated by non-kin. Boats were crewed with friends and acquaintances (63%), family mem- 16 The Puerto Rican minimum wage rate was $7.25 per hour (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017b) . bers (28%), or some combination of both (10%). Crew was recruited from local or neighboring communities. While information on past crew structure is limited Valdés-Pizzini (1985) notes that, at least on the west coast of Puerto Rico, most divers owned their boat or the diving equipment (or both), whereas boat tenders were hired hands. Most of these divers grew up in fi shing families, working on their family's trap and/or (deep-water snapper) vertical line operations but later transitioned to diving because of poor catches and working conditions.
There are several explanations for the prevalence of non-kin crew. One reason is that diving is a dangerous activity which favors recruitment decisions based on skill, teamwork, and compatibility rather than on kinship ties (Norr and Norr, 1974, 1978) .
A second reason has to do with the dispersal and weakening of kinship ties (Symes and Frangoudes, 2001 ). Owner-operators reported that they fi shed with non-kin because many had no family members who fi shed. Several fi shermen remarked that fi shing families are increasingly discouraging their offspring from pursuing fi shing because of the hardships of eking out a living. In addition, respondents noted that higher educational attainment, widening vocational aspirations, greater occupational mobility, and out-migration (to the continental United States) no longer made fi shing an "occupation of choice or necessity" (Symes and Frangoudes, 2001; van Ginkel, 2001; Symes, et al.,2015) . 17 A number of captains stated that they did not differentiate between kin and nonkin crew because the latter were considered part of the family stressing the 17 Despite high migration rates to the continental United States, remittance proceeds from Puerto Ricans tend to be lower than other comparable migrant groups (Dominicans and Mexicans). Duany (2010) argues that Puerto Ricans are less generous because recipients back home have access to public assistance (e.g., nutritional assistance, housing subsidies) and entitlement programs (e.g., Social Security, Medicare, disability, and unemployment benefi ts) which act as a safety net much like remittances do in the Dominican Republic and Mexico. Hence, Puerto Ricans feel less compelled to send money back home.
importance of affective social relations (Sonvisen et al., 2011) .
Respondents reported that capable divers and boat tenders were hard to come by. About 54% of the respondents said it was diffi cult to recruit divers, 3% held it was challenging, and an additional 17% stated it was easy. However, 27% could not answer this question because they were unfamiliar with the labor market since they had long-term relationships with their non-kin crew or relied on kin. Roughly 51% of the interviewees thought it was diffi cult to fi nd crew and another 23% said it was easy. However, as in the case of the question dealing with diver recruitment, almost 18% could not provide an answer.
Crew members exhibited a high degree of occupational fi delity. About 84% of respondents stated that they rarely employed new divers underlining the close-knit nature of the operation. Less than 2% of the divers surveyed stated that they employed at least one different diver on each trip. As one diver recounted, most individuals who became fi shermen were born with the yearning for the fi shing lifestyle. Close personal ties further cement these low turnover rates.
Effi cacy of the Queen Conch Seasonal Closure
The fi nal motivation of this study was to understand the degree to which the queen conch seasonal closure had proved useful. Fishing for queen conch is prohibited in Puerto Rico's jurisdictional waters from 1 Aug. through 31 Oct., and in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone year round with the exception of an area east of St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands.
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About 69% of the divers queried viewed the performance of the closure favorably, whereas the remaining felt its performance had either been fair or poor (Table 7) . Divers who held a positive view believed that the closure had helped conch populations by allowing the stock to reproduce and grow. Nonetheless, they felt that better policing and compliance were needed.
By contrast, divers who thought that the closure had done a fair job felt that the closure had a minimal impact (if any) on conch populations. Many of the divers who felt that the closure performed poorly believed that it initially worked but no longer was effective due to the lack of compliance and enforcement. Moreover, they questioned the science behind the need and timing of the closure and underscored signifi cant economic hardship brought about by the 3-mo closure. These divers also called for improved surveillance and enforcement.
Conclusion
Understanding the economic and social organization of the fi shery can play an important role in the choice of policy prescriptions. Aside from describing user groups that may gain or lose from the policy changes, organizational knowledge can also inform and, potentially infl uence, policy by discerning and mapping interrelationships, feedback loops, and cumulative processes that impact the well-being of these groups (Pollnac et al., 2006) . However, within a user group responses to policy changes can be complex and highly differential since they are infl uenced by, among other things, household demographics, capital investment, regulatory environment, accessible economic opportunities, and reference group behavior (Acheson, 2001 ).
This study found that the commercial dive fi shery in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is composed of seasoned, small-scale commodity producers, who use labor intensive and low technology capital to catch a variety of high valued species. Divers were highly dependent on fi shing which made them more likely to engage in dangerous fi shing practices particularly if recent landings were low. The study also suggested that the risky nature of diving, the limited availability of able crew, and the dispersal and weakening of kinship ties were important reasons behind the reliance on non-household labor.
While there are no plans to amend existing fi shery management plans, the fi ndings from this study suggest that the imposition of restrictive regulations would bring about signifi cant hardships on certain segments of the fi shery, particularly on middle-aged fi shermen who exhibited high degrees of fi shing dependence and occupational fi delity. Even worse, as noted by one of the reviewers, restrictive regulations may encourage riskier (e.g., multiple long dives during the open season), and even deceptive practices (e.g., night diving to evade enforcement) to offset income losses.
Finally, the study found that safety remains a besetting problem underscoring the need to improve safety at sea. Besides making concerted efforts to educate and disseminate information about the risks of diving and encouraging best practices (e.g., planning dives, checking equipment, learning about personal physical limits, resting between dives, etc.), fi shery managers could improve safety at sea by requiring diving certifi cations (or recertifi cations every number of years) to participate in certain fi sheries such as the queen conch fi shery, for which the Commonwealth already requires a dedicated permit (or endorsement). Fishery managers should also consider collecting data on injuries, accidents, and fatalities to assess the full impact of management actions and revise them as needed. 
